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The article deals with tip eﬀ  ects between evidential and epistemic components 
in the meaning potential of evidential markers in Bulgarian, the focus being on 
sentential adverbs with inferential functions. We justify (and start with) the fol 
lowing assumptions: (i) for any unit we should distinguish its stable semantic 
meaning from its pragmatic potential which can be favored (or disfavored) by ap 
propriate discourse conditions; (ii) there is a trade oﬀ   between evidential and epis 
temic meaning components that are related to each other on the basis of mutual 
or one sided implicatures; (iii) one sided implicatures occur with certain hearsay 
markers whose epistemic implicatures can be captured as Generalized Conversa 
tional Implicatures (GCIs). On this basis, we show that (iv) GCIs work also with 
inferential markers; they can be classiﬁ  ed depending on which component (the 
inferential or the epistemic one) can be downgraded more easily. A crucial factor 
favoring the inferential meaning is a perceptual basis of the inference. In general, 
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(v) the more complicated the reconstruction of the cognitive (or communicative) 
basis leading to an inference, the clearer the epistemic function emerges while 
the evidential function remains in the background, and vice versa. The study is 
corpus driven and also includes an a   empt at classifying micro  and macro con 
textual conditions that (dis)favor a highlighting of the evidential function.
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1.  Introduction
This article arose from an ongoing research project on evidential units in 
Slavic languages1. When working on a database of lexical markers of eviden 
tial functions we often encounter problems concerning the trade oﬀ   between 
evidential and epistemic components in the meaning potential of units under 
investigation. In relation to this topic, a variety of both theoretical and meth 
odological problems will be discussed here.
The article ﬁ  rst presents the theoretical background together with some 
unsolved puzzles (section 2), which have served as guidelines in our empirical 
work sustained by the analysis of corpus data. We will then continue by pick 
ing up one of the central problems and showing how tip eﬀ  ects of evidential vs. 
epistemic backgrounding‒foregrounding arise under diﬀ  erent context condi 
tions2. In general, if neither the particular unit in question nor the context 
narrows down the speciﬁ  c basis of judgment, the epistemic function of this 
unit becomes more salient than the evidential one. We want to substantiate 
this assertion by an analysis of examples from Bulgarian corpora (section 3)3. 
In connection with this, we will also deal with the phenomenon of heterosemy 
(3.1.2) and then discuss conclusions from our ﬁ  ndings (section 4).
2.  Theoretical premises
2.1  Semantics vs. pragmatics: a useful divide? – Yes!
First, we assume that a dividing line should be established between (i) the 
stable (or inherent) semantics of linguistic units and (ii) pragmatic eﬀ  ects that 
can be calculated on the basis of (i) and some sort of interaction with the 
linguistic or situational context of utterance. This divide should be upheld 
at least for methodological and, as it were, technical reasons. For if any kind 
of meaning arising in some speciﬁ  c context has to be considered as a distinct 
function of a string of linguistic elements (+ the context of utterance), we 
would be at a loss if we wanted to make generalizations and would certainly 
have to give up the endeavor of creating inventories of lexical units giving 
1  “Funktionsweisen und Struktur evidenzieller Markierungen im Slavischen (integrative 
Theorie mit Aufbau   einer Datenbasis)”, financed by the DFG (project nr. WI 
1286/13 1). We gratefully acknowledge this support by the DFG.
2  A similar small study has recently been presented by [H 2012] on the basis 
of Spanish newspaper texts.
3  We have used the Brown Corpus of the Institute for Bulgarian Language (BC), the 
novels of Pavel Vežinov Barierata (“The barrier”), Belijat gušter (“The white lizard”) 
and Ezernoto momče (“The lake boy”) as well as entries from Google.bg. If no source is 
provided the example was invented by the authors (BW/VK). A full list of sources and 
their abbreviations can be found before the References.8  |
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their share to the meaning of whole utterances. After all, it would be senseless 
to speak of an “interaction” between some particular units and their context 
(of whatever sort)4.
Second, we believe that among conversational implicatures we should 
distinguish particularized and generalized ones. In this respect, we adhere 
to neo Gricean approaches, not to Relevance Theory (for a comparison cf. 
[H 2007: 181–205; A 2008: 19–24]). In the following we will only 
be concerned with mechanisms that can be subsumed under the notion of 
Generalized  Conversational  Implicatures  (henceforth  GCI).  The  reason  is 
that GCIs amount to preferred, or default, interpretations. They are related 
to utterance type meaning (as a third type intermediate between sentence 
type meaning and utterance token meaning, following [L 1977: 13–18]), 
since GCIs are “dependent not upon direct computations about speaker in 
tentions (i.e. ad hoc implicatures, or inferences; BW/VK) but rather upon ex 
pectations about how language is characteristically used” [H 2007: 204; 
according to L 2000]. The level of utterance type meaning must be 
postulated because 
(i)    GCIs are defeasible, thus conversational and not code like;
(ii)    a theory about types is better than a theory about tokens, as it 
    “enjoys more predictive and explanatory power” [H, ibd.].
Furthermore, the notion of GCI also reduces the amount of lexical entries (in 
cluding all kinds of constructions) and of semantic components which oth 
erwise would have to be imputed into the inherent meaning of entries. Thus 
instead of listing numerous purported “meanings” of all sorts for a given unit 
(or construction), we get “slimmer” lists of meanings for that unit and can rel 
egate diﬀ  erent kinds of contextual eﬀ  ects or “overtones” to the interaction of 
that unit’s meaning with various components of the context in which it occurs.
Third, traditionally the divide between semantics and pragmatics hinges 
on the criterion of whether the unit in question (a singular item, an utterance, 
or a part thereof) can be assessed in terms of its contribution to truth condi 
tions; if it cannot, i.e., truth conditions do not seem to be relevant for the given 
unit, the phenomenon at hand should be deferred to pragmatics (cf. [A 
2008], among others). However, this criterion can become troublesome if we 
4  We are aware of (and sympathetic with) B, H’s [2009] claim to treat 
evidentiality (as well as other notional categories) as a ‘substance domain’ for which 
semantic pragmatic divides prove inadequate. However, here we advocate a separation 
of semantic and pragmatic components, since it is required for the purpose of creating 
a database of evidential markers. Like Boye and Harder we are interested in usage 
based distinctions, but in order to show how meaning emerges from context we have to 
imply conventionalized meanings of particular units. This methodological prerequisite 
confirms Boye and Harder’s approach, insofar as they, too, assume that usage 
preconceives structure.|  9 
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want to apply it to the meaning potential of propositional modiﬁ  ers (sentential 
adverbs, particles, epistemic auxiliaries). Putting it very brieﬂ  y, the function 
of propositional modiﬁ  ers consists in delimiting truth conditions. Epistemic 
modiﬁ  ers restrict them, since they function as a sort of probability ﬁ  lter on the 
proposition under their scope. By contrast, evidential modiﬁ  ers suspend truth 
conditions, insofar as they allow the speaker to be agnostic (i. e., non com 
mitted) as to whether the proposition holds or not (see 3.2.1)5. In either case 
such units, as a rule6, operate on propositions and, in this sense, bear on truth 
conditional semantics of utterances (cf. [F 2006, P 2006])7. 
Therefore, the treatment of their epistemic and/or evidential load should be 
delegated to semantics, provided this load proves to be non cancellable and 
detachable.
2.2  Onomasiological vs. semasiological approaches
Fourth, at least on an onomasiological (conceptual) level, epistemic and evi 
dential values can be clearly distinguished. As most concisely formulated by 
  [2005: 380],
[1]    “Evidentiality asserts the evidence, while epistemic modality 
    evaluates the evidence” (emphasis in the original).
We thus, by and large, understand evidentiality as 
[2]    “the linguistic means of indicating how the speaker obtained the 
    information on which s/he bases an assertion” [W 1988: 56]
and can, in principle, subscribe to Aikhenvald’s wording [A 2003: 1]
[3]    “Evidentiality proper is understood as stating the existence of a source  
    of evidence for some information; that includes stating that there is  
    some evidence, and also specifying what type of evidence there is”
although we will have to restrict this deﬁ  nition later on (see 2.3).
5  Cf. [D H 2009] for a similar argument on the basis of Engl. must vs. its Dutch 
cognate moeten. Cf. also [A 2004: 4]: “(…) marking data source and 
concomitant categories is ‘not a function of truth or falsity’.”
6  There have been claims that some (uses of) evidential markers should rather be 
classified as illocutionary operators (cf., among others, [H 2006] and 
[Schenner 2010: 167]). If this proves true the questions arises whether speech act 
operators can be treated in truth conditional semantic terms. This problem need not 
however be tackled here.
7  For a recent critical overview concerning the relation between epistemic modality 
operators and truth conditions cf. [P 2009: 144–184].10  |
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In recent years the relationship between evidential and epistemic func 
tions has quite often been the subject of disputes. Some researchers have held 
the view that epistemic meanings include evidential ones (e. g., [P 1986] 
and, until recently, most traditional approaches), whereas others have argued 
exactly the opposite (e. g., [P 2001]; see below), and still others have 
considered that both domains cross cut each other (e. g., [V D A, 
P 1998]) or that they are largely independent of one another (e. g., 
[A 2003, 2004; X    2005]) and they are under a common 
superordinate category (cf. [B 2006, P 2001]). For a brief survey 
and references cf. [K 2008: 167; D H 2009: 263–265]. We abide 
by the latter view and determine epistemic modality and evidentiality to be 
subdomains of propositional modality (as was already proposed in [P 
2001]).
One of the main sources of confusion concerning the mutual relationship 
between these two domains has been that epistemic and evidential functions 
have been mixed up with markers (forms). Notice that Aikhenvald’s deﬁ  nition 
of evidentiality given above in [3] relates to functions, not to markers; it is thus 
a notional deﬁ  nition, not a semasiological one. In practice, however, such deﬁ   
nitions are frequently used as if they referred to discrete units (morphemes, 
function words) of some language; these are then usually called ‘evidentials’, 
and the ﬂ  oor is open for quarrels concerning their epistemic vs. evidential 
nature. Therefore, disputes concerning the relationship between evidentiality 
and epistemic modality can, at least in part, be mitigated (or avoided) if we 
distinguish onomasiological from semasiological approaches. From an ono 
masiological viewpoint there is no way of identifying or reducing one of these 
notions to the other (cf. [W, S 2010: 277]). To recognize this it is 
suﬃ   cient to realize that epistemic meanings (functions) are of a scalar (grad 
able) nature, while evidential meanings cannot be graded because they are of 
a categorial nature.
Real  analytical  problems  arise  from  a  semasiological  perspective,  i.e. 
when it comes to analyzing  ling u istic  u nits (or devices) of particular 
languages: in their semantic potential we are notoriously confronted with 
overlaps,  “overtones”  or  similar  vaguely  captured  relations  between  sub 
jective probability assessments and references to the source of judgment8. 
There is reason to argue for contextually conditioned tip eﬀ  ects typical for 
units associated with speaker’s basis of judgment and its epistemic modiﬁ  ca 
tion (see 2.4).
8  Note that such overlaps are nothing particular to propositional modality; we also find 
them with tense and aspect, in tense mood asymmetries, or with definiteness and 
referentiality (in article systems), to name but some of the most prominent standard 
cases of conflation of notional distinctions in linguistic expression classes.|  11 
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2.3  Toward more fine grained taxonomies of evidential functions
We abide by the accepted global division of evidential functions into the three 
sub domains of (i) direct, (ii) indirect evidentiality, which, in turn, subdivides 
into (ii.a) inferential and (ii.b) reportive evidentiality (cf. [A 2003; 
2004, W 1988], and others, cf. most distinctly in [P 2001]). 
The crucial criterion yielding this division is not so much the cognitive or 
communicative ‘source of evidence’ (or knowledge, or information)9 but the 
'‘modes of knowing’, or ‘type of evidence’ (for this distinction cf. [S 
2001: 302], following [C 1986] and [B 1997]). In the analytic part 
of this article (section 3), we are going to focus on inferential evidentiality, i.e., 
the mode of knowing which rests on reasoning (inferring). It is more complex 
insofar as it is much more diﬃ   cult to keep evidential and epistemic meaning 
components apart in inferentives than in reportive units. This holds true not 
only in analytic terms (i. e., from a semasiological perspective), but also to 
some extent even from the conceptual (i. e., onomasiological) point of view.
As concerns subdivisions within inferential evidentiality, we subscribe 
to a distinction based on whether or not the speaker had perceptual access 
to the situation that served as the basis for his/her inference. This corre 
sponds to Squartini’s distinction [S 2008] between circumstantial 
(perception based) and generic (or deductive, i. e., not perception based) in 
ferentives.10  However, Squartini also postulated a third group of units mark 
ing ‘conjectures’. This third group is rather arguable since, for Squartini, such 
markers are used when “all external evidence is missing, the speaker being 
solely responsible for the reasoning process” [S 2008: 925]. There is 
thus no reference to any speciﬁ  c source of knowledge. The principal problem 
posed by this notion (and the associated class of markers) is the following: if 
we accept, following P [2001: 354], that “an evidential supplement 
can always be seen in an epistemic marker, [while] the opposite does not al 
ways hold”, all epistemic markers must also be inferential; any sort of reason 
ing is based on just some basis, even if it has to be seen as merely ‘conjectural’.
The same problem shows up if we consider that some deﬁ  nitions of eviden 
tiality involve “... stating that there is some evidence …” (cf. [A 2003: 
1; see above: 3]; cf. also [D H 2005: 380–382]). Our observations show that 
this criterion is not suﬃ   cient for a unit to become an inferential marker. It is too 
unspeciﬁ  c to prevent us from considering that a real ﬂ  ood of units (mainly senten 
9  For a critical survey of the concepts on which evidential units really operate cf. 
[L, L 2010: 310–314]. For our present purpose, we may neglect 
these distinctions, although we consider typical evidential markers to operate on 
propositions (not on information or states of affairs); cf. [B 2010].
10  An analogical distinction was mentioned by [P 2010: 30], who restricted 
the term ‘inferential (inferentive)’ to perception based inferences and opposed it to 
(markers of) ‘presumptive (inference)’ ones in case the conclusion is drawn without 
any perceptual basis.12  |
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tial adverbs and so called modal particles) with an undoubtedly epistemic value 
which eo ipso (see above the quote from [P 2001]) is connected to just 
some basis (or source) of judgment. In our opinion, the problem can be resolved, 
at least in operative terms, if we cancel this part of Aikhenvald’s deﬁ  nition and 
restrict inferentives to units with speciﬁ  c reference to circumstantial or generic 
evidence11. If this is not the case, the epistemic function of the unit becomes more 
salient than the evidential one12. This assertion shall be substantiated in section 3.
A survey of Bulgarian lexical markers showed that the division ‘circumstan 
tial – generic inferentives’ can also be maintained, more or less, for this language, 
although many units are compatible with a very broad range of inferential (and 
epistemic) functions, and some of them can be extended even to hearsay (cf. 
[K, W 2011a, b]). Due to diagnostic contexts (minimal pair condi 
tions), we have, in [K, W 2011a, b], distinguished three types of mark 
ers according to their evidential functions. There are types A and B, both with 
a default of perception based inferences (= ‘circumstantials’) but with diﬀ  erent 
extensions into the evidential subdomains ‘direct perception’ and ‘retrospection’13. 
These types can be opposed to type C, which has a default of inferences not based 
on perception (= ‘generics’). A characteristic of type C markers is that they can be 
used rather indiscriminately with reference to any kind of source of inference. We 
shall illustrate the diﬀ  erence between types A/B and C with the following diag 
nostic context for generic (non perceptional) inferences14: 
(1)     Deteto navjarno, verojatno, sigurno (type C) / *izgležda, javno, 
    očevidno (type B) / *maj (če), kato če li, sjakaš (type A) e mnogo 
    tăžno. Morskoto mu svinče umrja.
  ‘The child is probably / possibly / certainly very sad. His guinea pig 
  has died.’ 
11  This subdivision of the mode of knowing can, in principle, be cross classified with the 
type of evidence (visual, auditive, palpatory etc.). However, in practice — at least for 
the languages of concern studied here — this dimension proves to be irrelevant with 
respect to inferential evidentiality.
12  In principle, this was already conceded by [P 2001: 354]: “an epistemic marker 
con  tains more evidential properties when the source of the speaker’s hypothesis is specified”.
13  Type A has a broader functional extension than type B, as shown by diagnostic 
contexts for direct perception [i] and for retrospective inference [ii]:
[i] (sb is looking at himself/herself): Maj (če), kato če li, sjakaš (type A) / 
#izgležda, javno, očevidno (type B) levijat mi krak e po malăk ot desnija. ‘Apparently 
my left foot is smaller than the right oneʼ.
Possible meaning with markers of type B: ‘The new right shoe does not fit so well 
as the left one. So I conclude that my right foot is biggerʼ. 
[ii] retrospective inference (trying to remember something): Majka mi maj (če), 
kato če li, sjakaš / *izgležda, javno, očevidno imaše edna bratovčedka ot Amerika. 
‘(I remember) as though my mother had a cousin in Americaʼ.
14  The markers given in (1–2) are typical exponents of the respective types, but we can 
find more representatives for each type.|  13 
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In this case, deductive inference is drawn on the basis of encyclopaedic or 
background knowledge of a concrete person. Markers of type A and B are 
incompatible with this kind of generic inference or they alter the basis of judg 
ment conveyed by the whole utterance as perception based inference. Com 
pare the same sentence as in (1) with another cognitive background, which 
allows an inference from an observable situation:
(2)    (The child looks very unhappy and has tears in its eyes.) Deteto maj 
    (če), kato če li, sjakaš (type A) / izgležda, javno, očevidno (type B) e 
    mnogo tăžno.
  ‘The child is probably / possibly / certainly very sad.’
Here markers of type C (e. g., navjarno, verojatno, sigurno) are possible, too, 
but they block, as it were, an interpretation according to which the speaker 
has arrived at his/her conclusion from the observation of perceivable facts. 
The default of type A and B markers can be overwritten in certain circum 
stances. This default change has to do with the evidential epistemic tip eﬀ  ect 
we will deal with below.
Now, quite obviously, an account of units used for marking inferences 
in terms of evidentiality becomes more troublesome the broader their range 
of meaning (or usage?) proves to be. If we want to disentangle evidential and 
epistemic meaning components and empirically verify whether such compo 
nents are suﬃ   ciently stable ingredients of their lexical meaning — and not 
just pragmatic eﬀ  ects arising from GCI — we must gain a more precise un 
derstanding of whether and how, for a given unit, purported components are 
subject to metonymic tip eﬀ  ects by which either epistemic or evidential com 
ponents become foregrounded (and the other backgrounded), and to what ex 
tent this depends on inﬂ  uence from diﬀ  erent context types. In addition to this, 
we should admit that an epistemic modiﬁ  er would be better excluded from an 
inventory of evidential units (of a given language), if we cannot narrow down 
a more speciﬁ  c evidential function. Only then can we manage to formulate 
workable and adequate lexical explications of evidential units.
In the following we are primarily interested in the impact exerted by cer 
tain types of context conditions on the interpretation of utterances which con 
tain lexical markers with an evidential potential (see section 3). Nonetheless, 
the mirror image of this relation between linguistic units and their contexts is 
to be recognized in the fact that contexts become incompatible with certain evi 
dential markers if the lexical meaning of the latter narrows the range of knowl 
edge background serving as the basis for the judgment (see 2.1). In particular, 
this holds for the distinction [± perception based] (= ‘circumstantial – generic 
inferentives’) already mentioned and for units with a meaning indiscriminate 
in this regard. We will point out such incompatibilities in section 3.14  |
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2.4  Factivity vs. fictivity status and meaning ranges (inherent or contextual?)
Tip eﬀ  ects of epistemic vs. evidential fore  or backgrounding seem to depend 
on the factivity vs. ﬁ  ctivity status of the given unit (cf. [L 2009]). For 
instance, [L, L 2010] showed that Engl. seem has a very broad 
range of collocations. In fact, irrespective of how it is used syntactically (on 
heterosemy see section 3.1.1), it is extremely ﬂ  exible. For instance, it may col 
locate with rhetoric boosters or epistemic modiﬁ  ers close to the certainty pole 
(see ex. 3), but it may also occur with hedges that weaken the speaker’s stance 
and with epistemic modiﬁ  ers close to the uncertainty pole (see ex. 4):
(3a)   The monthly fees sound low, and for millions of users they evidently
    seem so...
(3b)   They sure seem to be able to do some things right...
(4a)   Which is why maybe he seems so composed...
(4b)   ... it just seems like the whole world is spinning out of control...
    (quoted after [L, L 2010: 315])
The authors propose two alternative conclusions to these observations, which 
at ﬁ  rst sight appear to be a dilemma [L, L 2010: 315]:
“If we wish to save seem as an evidential, we would have to eliminate 
adverbs such as obviously, apparently, evidently from the category of evi 
dentials and relegate them to the epistemic category, or we would have to 
assume that evidentiality can be expressed twice”.
We think that, unless it can be proven that evidential values cannot, in prin 
ciple, be expressed twice (for one proposition), the second alternative is more 
attractive.  Actually,  [L,  L  2010]  highlighted  two  diﬀ  erent 
problems:
(i)    The signiﬁ  cance of collocational properties for a data driven analysis 
of markers associated with a distinction of factivity vs. ﬁ  ctivity status. The 
question is whether (and to what extent) observations arising from corpus 
analyses allow us to draw conclusions (or build hypotheses) about the seman 
tic load of propositional modiﬁ  ers, i. e., what belongs to their “proper seman 
tics”. This semantics can remain vague (or, rather, diﬀ  use).
(ii)    How can the semantics of diﬀ  use units be captured in terms of their 
lexicological description? The counterpart to this question is: which condi 
tions of context give a contour to diﬀ  use meanings?
Issue (ii) is directly related to the point we made in 2.1 with respect to 
GCIs. It is essential to establish a semantic core, more particularly to decide 
whether stable meaning components bear evidential or rather epistemic (or 
some other) functions, whereas other “shades of (utterance) meaning” are 
evoked only in interaction with certain context conditions. As for these, we |  15 
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may distinguish between micro conditions — such as the immediate lin 
guistic context (on the level of the sentence) supporting the reconstruction 
of an inference, i. e. the evidential reading — and macro conditions, such 
as the discourse genre or the global illocutive purpose of a given text. For in 
stance, [W, S 2010] argue that ‘epistemic overtones’ of some Ger 
man and Polish reportive markers arise on the basis of GCIs, with the report 
ive (i. e., evidential) function being inherent, whereas the epistemic function 
is cancelable (cf. [O 2007] on Mexican Spanish and [C 2009] on 
English for similar results). It occurs that the epistemic function is cancelable 
especially under certain macro contextual conditions, namely, in juridically 
relevant texts such as newspaper reports from court trials or TV news about 
police or secret service activities.
Thus the question arises as to whether similar micro  and/or macro con 
textual conditions can be ﬁ  gured out for evidential markers in Bulgarian. This 
is the question we will pursue in the remaining part of our article.
3.  Factors influencing the interplay between evidential and 
epistemic functions
For the following data driven investigation we need to make some at least very 
rough distinctions of what otherwise would absolutely vaguely be named ‘con 
text’. We do not pretend at being original, but simply want to draw certain pre 
liminary lines of division between types of environment with which evidential 
markers (and utterances modiﬁ  ed by them) are claimed to interact. The choice 
of lines of division is, of course, conditioned by our own research interests and 
based, to some extent, on an intuitive understanding of relevant distinctions.
For the following data driven investigation we need to make some at least 
very rough distinctions of what otherwise would absolutely vaguely be named 
'‘context’. We do not pretend at being original, but simply want to draw cer 
tain preliminary lines of division between types of environment with which 
evidential markers (and utterances modiﬁ  ed by them) are claimed to interact. 
The choice of lines of division is, of course, conditioned by our own research 
interests and, to some extent, on an intuitive understanding of relevant dis 
tinctions.
By ‘macro contextʼ we mean conditions of the larger linguistic context 
into which utterances are embedded as well as text genres for which certain 
usage patterns of linguistic forms (in terms of their functions and/or frequen 
cy) can be shown to be characteristic. Macro contextual factors can then be 
contrasted, on the one hand, with encyclopedic knowledge, which is essential 
ly based on information not supplied by any linguistic context, but by back 
ground knowledge, which helps interpreting utterances in their situational 16  |
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setting15. Admittedly, this distinction is often diﬃ   cult to establish—at least 
since knowledge (or habits) concerning discourse genres can be considered as 
part of general background knowledge, too. However, we suggest that there 
should be a principled distinction between knowledge based on larger stretch 
es of explicitly uttered linguistic discourse (text) and knowledge rooted in 
all kinds of cultural and situational background that, for the given utterance 
with a marker under investigation, is not stated explicitly in the text.
On the other hand, macro contextual conditions should be treated sepa 
rately from the linguistic ‘micro context’, which we understand as units at the 
clause and sentence level. Sentence level is at once the upper boundary for the 
immediate scope of propositional modiﬁ  ers to which grammatical and lexical 
markers of epistemic and evidential functions belong (see 2.1). Such scope prop 
erties belong to the linguistic code, i. e., to the inherent (thus semantic) proper 
ties of the relevant units (on a grammar‒lexicon cline), and, thus, need not be 
computed from interaction with the context (or the situation of utterance).
The criteria mentioned above for distinguishing kinds of discourse (or 
knowledge) background that may become relevant for the interpretation of 
evidential epistemic modiﬁ  ers are summarized in the following table.
Table 1.  Discourse conditions for the interpretation of evidential epistemic modifiers
micro 
context
macro context
encyclopaedic 
knowledge
structural 
scope of 
modiﬁ  ers
clause or
 sentence (theoretically) unrestricted not relevant
type of back 
ground
(I)
linguistic (uttered explicitly) situational
type of back 
ground
(II)
code like
not code like, but dependent 
on properties of (larger) dis 
course stretches 
not at all bound 
to linguistic 
code
generalizable not generaliz 
able
based on 
experience 
with the use 
of discourse 
genres
15  In many approaches and handbooks, what we dub ‘contextʼ has been called ‘co textʼ 
(cf., e. g., [Y 1996: 21f]), whereas background knowledge and ‘situational settingʼ 
fall into what has often been referred to as ‘cultural contextʼ. Cf., for instance, [H 
 1999] for similar distinctions.|  17  Björn Wiemer, Veronika Kampf
We will now discuss diﬀ  erent types of micro  and macro contextual condi 
tions (3.1 and 3.2) as well as illustrate how the interpretation of markers 
with an epistemic evidential meaning potential may depend on encyclopedic 
knowledge (3.2.2) and how it “reacts” if no speciﬁ  c background knowledge is 
supplied (3.3).
3.1  Micro contextual factors
As stated above, micro contextual factors are bound to the immediate linguis 
tic context that supports the reconstruction of an inference, i. e., the evidential 
reading intended by the speaker. We may split these factors into two groups: 
(i) those in which the respective marker shows diﬀ  erent syntactic behavior 
with respect to the proposition it modiﬁ  es (= heterosemy); (ii) those in which 
the speciﬁ  c cognitive or communicative background for the proposition modi 
ﬁ  ed by the respective marker is made explicit in a sentence (utterance) imme 
diately preceding or following the sentence with that marker. Conditions (i) 
and (ii) are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, the boundaries between micro 
contextual factors of kind (ii) and macro contextual factors are fuzzy. In fact, 
this arises from the fact that there are neither clear cut deﬁ  nitions of sentence 
boundaries, nor conventions of punctuation that would unanimously mark 
such boundaries. We will ﬁ  rst illustrate cases of kind (i) (3.1.1) before turning 
to kind (ii) (3.1.2).
  3.1.1  Heterosemy of Bulgarian inferential units
For the treatment of intra sentential (= micro contextual) cues to the behaviour 
of inferential markers the notion of ‘heterosemy’ proves helpful. According to 
[L 1991: 476], heterosemy exists “where two or more meanings or 
functions that are historically related, in the sense of deriving from the same ul 
timate source, are borne by reﬂ  exes of the common source element that belong 
in diﬀ  erent morphosyntactic categories”. Heterosemy is important for us insofar 
as diﬀ  erent syntactic realizations may have consequences for the function of the 
unit as a propositional modiﬁ  er (evidential, epistemic, other). In practice, het 
erosemy in the domain of evidentiality and other ﬁ  elds of propositional assess 
ment has been shown to occur, e. g., in Spanish. Cf. [C 2007: ch. 2+3] 
who demonstrated that the epistemic load and (range of) evidential functions of, 
e. g., the (semi )auxiliary parecer ‘to seem’ varies with its syntactic realization 
(as a matrix verb having either a ﬁ  nite or an inﬁ  nitival complement, as a par 
ticle used parenthetically, etc.). Another kind of heterosemy occurs with Russ. 
poxože ‘similarlyʼ; compare the following examples from [L 2010: 362f] 
which show that the factivity status of the proposition in the scope of poxože de 
pends on whether this unit is used as a particle (5a) or as a complement taking 
predicate (= predicative) as in (5b):18  |
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Russian poxože
(5a)   Poxože, Vasja upal.     
  (No na samom dele on stoit kak štyk.)
   ‘Vasja has fallen, it seems.’ (lit. ‘looks like’)
  ‘But in actual fact he is standing straight as a post.’
  ← non factive, can be denied
(5b)   Poxože, čto Vasja upal. 
  (*No na samom dele on stoit kak štyk.)
  ‘It looks/seems as if Vasja has fallen’.
  *‘But in actual fact he is standing straight as a post’.
  ← factive, cannot be denied
The same kind of heterosemy can be observed with Bulg. izgležda ‘it 
seems’ (literally: ‘it looks’); another case in point would be po vsičko liči ‘to all 
appearances’ (literally ‘from everything it becomes obvious’). Compare the 
following examples, which show that the factivity status of the proposition in 
the scope of izgležda depends on whether this unit is used as a particle (6a) or 
as a complement taking predicate (= predicative) as in (6b):
Bulgarian
(6a)   Svatbarite, izgležda, sa praznuvali do kăsno. 
  ‘The wedding guests, it seems, have celebrated till late.’
  ← non factive, can be denied, e. g., by continuing:
  No vsăštnost tova može i da ne e vjarno. ‘However it may not be true.’
(6b)  Izgležda, če svatbarite sa praznuvali do kăsno.
  ‘It seems that the wedding guests have celebrated till late.’
  ← factive, cannot be denied
  (*No vsăštnost tova može i da ne e vjarno. ‘However it may not be true’.)
Contrary to Russian and other languages, Bulg. izgležda is not a  unit 
but a  unit, i. e., its etymology is based on the converse of . This con 
verse meaning (‘look like / as if’) shows up in its use as a standard form from 
the paradigm of this verb (7). As a particle, izgležda has lost this paradigmatic 
relationship and acquired a lexicalized meaning as an evidential marker (8):
Bulgarian
(7)  Kăštata izgležda pusta otvătre. 
  ‘The house looks empty inside.’
(8)   Kăštata, izgležda, e pusta otvătre. 
  ‘The house is, it seems, empty inside.’|  19 
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A similar case of heterosemy with the same semantic eﬀ  ect occurs with 
the units očevidno ‘obviously’ and javno ‘obviously’; both function as senten 
tial adverbs (i. e., they modify a proposition, but are not the syntactic predicate 
of the clause; see 9a) and predicatives (i. e., they are themselves the syntactic 
predicate; see 9b). If used as predicatives, očevidno and javno can combine with 
the copula or appear without it: očevidno (e), če and javno (e), če. The usage 
of the predicative variant without the copula is more colloquial and does not 
appear in corpora of printed texts which we have consulted. The occurrence of 
the copula seems to be an additional factor favoring factivity:
Bulgarian
(9a)   Оčevidno (javno) mnogo malăk procent ot bălgarite umejat da pluvat.
  ‘Obviously only a small percentage of Bulgarians can swim’ .
  ← non factive, can be denied:
  No vsăštnost tova može i da ne e vjarno. ‘However it may not really be
  true’.
(9b)   Оčevidno (javno) e, če mnogo malăk procent ot bălgarite umejat da pluvat.
  ‘It is obvious that only a small percentage of Bulgarians can swim’.
  ← factive, cannot be denied:
  *No vsăštnost tova može i da ne e vjarno. 
  ‘However it may not be true’. 
  [http://www.focus news.net/?id=f17740: Оčevidno e, če …] 
With other units predicative usage does not allow the copula to be left out 
even in colloquial speech; compare, for instance: verojatno e da (če) ‘it is prob 
able that’ / sigurno e, če ‘it is certain that’ (cf. [K, W 2011a: 49]).
Notice furthermore that all the Bulgarian heterosemic evidential mark 
ers mentioned above are reluctant to developing into complementizers, while 
their Russian equivalents have clearly developed (or are on their way toward) 
such a syntactic function (cf. [L 2010]). Compare Russ. budto by ‘as ifʼ 
(10) with Bulg. sjakaš and kato če li (11):
Russian
(10)  (Mne) kažetsja, budto by Ivan pʼjan.
   ‘It seems (to me) as if Ivan was drunk.’
Bulgarian
(11)  *Struva mi se, sjakaš / kato če li Ivan e pĳ  an. 
  ‘It seems to me as if Ivan was drunk.’20  |
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  3.1.2  Specific knowledge background made explicit in the neighboring sentence
In such cases, the micro context gives some speciﬁ  c reference to a particular 
(visual, auditive, or other perceptual) mode of knowledge. In this case the 
epistemic function moves to the background.
Such reference can be conveyed by descriptions of a subject. The formu 
lation chosen gives the impression of this subject’s direct perception or of its 
activity. Every kind of perception can be highlighted by a narrator, most fre 
quently visual perception as in (12–15), auditive as in (16), but also palpative 
perception (e. g., ‘hot—cold’) as in (17)16: 
(12)  Široka radostna usmivka be ozarila liceto ì, no kato go vidja – 
  mignoveno ugasna. Očevidno be očakvala drug čovek… 
  A wide merry smile had appeared on her face, but as she saw him it 
  disappeared instantly. Obviously she had waited for another person
  to come’. [BG, 186]
(13)  Gălăbăt izgležda se izplaši, zaštoto vednaga se zaspuska.
  ‘Apparently the pigeon was frightened because it immediately ran 
  downstairs’. [BC: Găă] 
(14)  Liceto mu izgleždaše udiveno, toj javno be čul poslednite dumi na majka si.
  ‘His face looked puzzled. 
  ‘Obviously he had heard the last words of his mother’. [EM, 238]
(15)   Nakraja kato če li se beše umoril – dumite stavaha vse po provlačeni, 
  redovete se smăkvaha nadolu. 
  ‘Eventually he seemed to have become tired – his words became
  more and more drawn out, the lines slipped down’. [EM, 281]
(16)   George započna da im govori nešto povelitelno na ruski – javno im 
  iskaše ključa na motora.
  ‘George started speaking in a commanding tone something in 
  Russian; obviously he demanded the key of the motor cycle’. [BC: SZK]
(17)  Dokato razmišljavaše, Khan useti, če stava po hladno i trudno za 
  dišane – javno približavaše kăm goljam voden basejn. 
  ‘While Khan was thinking, he felt that it got colder and more diﬃ   cult 
  to breathe; obviously he was getting closer to a big water basin’. [BC: HO]
The impression of the subject’s direct witnessing or action arises in the 
micro context of a complex sentence or neighboring sentences through verbs 
indicating direct perception like ‘to feel’ (see 17 above), ‘to see’ (18), ‘to hear’ 
(19) or the imitation of the way of speaking (20):
16  Here and in the following examples the relevant words giving “evidential hints” will be 
underlined.|  21 
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(18)  I sjakaš go vidjah kak trepna na stola. 
  ‘It seemed to me as if I saw him twitch in the chair’. [EM, 271]
(19)  Dara se zasluša – izgležda krajat nabližavaše. 
  ‘Dara started to listen intently – the end was close, it seemed’. [BC: SL]
(20)  Ne e! – Giovanni očevidno tărseše kakvo da kaže – Rabotata e mnogo 
  debela a!
  ‘Nooo! – Obviously Giovanni was looking for what to say. – The 
  matter is very se erious…’ [BC: N]
In other cases, the speciﬁ  c reference can be of a more complex, not pri 
marily perceptual nature, but the connection to the source of inference is nev 
ertheless explicitly given in the micro context. Encyclopedic knowledge may 
sustain perception based inference as an additional factor (see 3.2.2). This 
can be illustrated by the following examples:
(21)  Dvata trupa obšto imaha poveče ot 400 kinta – javno bjaha vzeli 
  zaplati.
  ‘In both bodies there were more than 400 Leva; obviously they had got 
  a salary’. 
  [BC: http://scanman.wordpress.com/2007] 
  [a big amount of money]
  → inference: the dead men had got a salary and hadn’t still spent it.
(22)  Bebeto otdavna be preminalo vsički srokove za svoeto raždane, no 
  vse ošte be živo i žizneno v neja. Izgležda, če mu haresvaše tam, da si 
  živee spokojno i nesmuštavano na čužda smetka… 
  ‘The baby has long passed all terms for its birth, but was still alive 
  and lively in her. It seemed to like it there, living calmly without 
  disturbances at other people’s costs’ [BG, 104]
  [The regular time of birth of a baby has long passed by.]
  → inference: The baby likes its place to stay and doesn’t want to be  
  born.
(23)  Nesi kato če li i instinkti njamaše. Toj užasno se učudi, kato otkri, če 
  jutĳ  ata pari. …      
  ‘Nesi seemed to have no instincts either. He was very puzzled 
  noticing that the iron burns when one touches it’. [BG, 112]
The protagonist of the science ﬁ  ction novel by P. Vežinov is an extraordi 
nary person with many intellectual gifts but without normal human feelings 
and instincts. This inference is drawn through an incident with a hot iron.
It is important to stress that the diﬀ  erence of [± perception based] in 
ference built into the semantics of these markers seems to be blurred in cer 22  |
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tain cases (see 2.3), namely, if the reconstruction of an evidential basis is not 
possible from general (encyclopedic) knowledge, there is also no contextual 
aid supporting the evidential reading, so it is overshadowed by the epistemic 
function of the marker irrespective of the semantic type the inferential marker 
belongs to.
Therefore, one of the following constellations appears to be necessary for 
an evidential reading to become foregrounded:
1.  A marker with a default of perception based inferences with clear mi 
cro  or macro contextual support for the evidential function (3.1.2 and 3.2.2).
2.  A marker with a default of perception based inferences without such 
contextual aid, but the basis for the inference can be unambiguously recon 
structed due to encyclopedic knowledge (3.2.2).
3.  A marker with semantically indiscriminate functions but only in the 
case of explicit logical (causal) relations (see end of 3.3). If the latter con 
dition applies, non perception based (‘generic’) inferential meaning can be 
foregrounded.
Both perception based and non perception based markers can reduce or 
lose their evidential meaning if these constellations are not maintained. If they 
are not, the inference cannot be reconstructed and, as a consequence, the epis 
temic meaning becomes foregrounded.
3.2  Macro contextual factors
Among macro contextual conditions we should distinguish between condi 
tions which can be generalized — for instance, ways in which one may ﬁ  gure 
out some sort or other of properties typical for text genres — and conditions 
which do not lend themselves easily to generalizations. In a sense, this distinc 
tion can be compared to the diﬀ  erence between generalized vs. particularized 
conversational implicatures (on which see 2.1): in neither case can macro 
contextual factors be reduced to functions of the linguistic code, but, whereas 
generalizable conditions rest on more general knowledge about how certain 
discourse types work and which kinds of illocutionary purpose their authors 
(speakers) normally pursue (3.2.1), non generalizable macro contextual con 
ditions bear an ad hoc nature and, thus, do not allow for more “tight and ready” 
formulations on how they arise and what properties they display (3.2.2). They 
can hardly be predicted and consequently cannot be made the basis for rules.
  3.2.1  Generalizable macro contextual factors
Bulgarian is well known for its system of so called renarrative forms (Bulg. 
'‘preizkazni formi’), which should rather be classiﬁ  ed as grammatical markers 
of indirect evidentiality (in the sense explained in 2.3, i. e., comprising infer |  23 
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ential and reportive functions). Roughly, this paradigm of forms derives from 
a reinterpretation of the perfect or, more precisely, of the present and the past 
perfect, which, however, diﬀ  er in function regarding their connection to mo 
dality. The perfect is marked with a participle with an l suﬃ   x plus an auxiliary 
indicating person and number (beside tense)17. 
The reinterpretation of the past perfect in Bulgarian is claimed to have led 
to the rise of a modiﬁ  ed paradigm, which functions as a separate evidential 
paradigm. It is a melange of evidential and epistemic values and called ‘dubi 
tative’ by some Bulgarian grammarians (cf. [N 2008: 370ﬀ  .]). There 
is an essential diﬀ  erence between the ‘preizkazni formiʼ based on the present 
perfect, which is epistemically neutral (A), and the forms based on the past 
perfect, which do carry an epistemic load (B). This diﬀ  erence appears in the 
following minimal pair of utterances, cited from [N 2008: 336]:
(A)  Petrov stanal direktor. ‘Petrov is said to have become director.ʼ
  ‘preizkazna formaʼ derived from present perfect → reportive
(B)  Petrov bil stanal direktor. ‘Petrov allegedly has become director. 
  [But I don’t believe it.]ʼ
  ‘preizkazna formaʼ derived from past perfect → dubitative
While the epistemic load of the dubitative is the distinctive feature of these 
paradigmatic forms, the non dubitative forms among ‘preizkazni formi’ oﬀ  er 
in this respect a more diﬀ  erentiated picture. Some researchers have observed 
interesting evidential epistemic tip eﬀ  ects that depend on the discourse type. 
Since Bulgarian does not have proper lexical evidentials for reportive mean 
ings (cf. [K, W 2011a–b]), we will illustrate this point with gram 
matical evidentials, to which the paradigm of ‘preizkazni formi’ belongs.
Thus a particular case of macro contextual conditions can be inferred 
from the results of K’s [2000] investigation of ‘preizkazni formi’ 
in the 20th century Bible translation into Bulgarian18. Her ﬁ  ndings elucidate 
17  Many investigators, especially from Bulgaria, have claimed that the formal expression 
of both main evidential functions (inferential vs. reportive) is identical only in the 
1st and 2nd SG/PL forms: in the 3rd SG/PL form the reportive function is indicated 
by the mere l participle (without the auxiliary), whereas the inferential function 
coincides with the perfect of the indicative, i. e., the combination of the l participle and 
the third person form of the auxiliary ‘to beʼ (săm.1SG, si.2SG, e.3SG, etc.); cf. inter 
alia, [G 1996]. Most recent research shows, however, that the reportive 
function can be expressed with this form, too, depending on discourse factors (cf. 
[L 2010: 418]). There are reasons to accept another view due to which all 
evidential interpretations of the l forms in Bulgarian arise from one paradigm, with 
lack of the auxiliary being conditioned by the instantiation of an observer (= instance 
of judgment) who differs from the actual speaker (or narrator); cf. [S 
2012] for an elaborate argument backed by an empirical investigation.
18  She based her study on the 1982 reprint of the acknowledged translation published in 
1925. This edition basically represents Modern Bulgarian usage also with respect to 
"“renarrative” (‘preizkazni’) forms.24  |
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that, in Modern Bulgarian, these forms are inappropriate in contexts where 
the purpose is to not provoke any doubt as to the veracity (or trustworthiness) 
of the related events. In particular, these forms do not occur in acts of revela 
tion (which believing Christians, among them the authors of the New Testa 
ment, must take for granted) and in narrative (but not re narrative!) passages 
where the author is indicated (i. e., identiﬁ  able) unambiguously.
It is intriguing to look at the reasons for these results. We argue that, in 
general, the Bulgarian ‘preizkazni formi’ have to be considered as epistemical 
ly neutral (contrary to the dubitative forms) since there are a few context types 
where the occurrence of these forms does not raise any epistemic overtones. 
Consider, for instance, an excerpt from a history book (24) and an isolated 
utterance which could have appeared in any sort of colloquial dialogue (25); 
there is no reason to be skeptical about the proposition uttered: 
(24)  Starite bălgari bili nenadminati majstori v juvelirnoto izkustvo. 
  ‘The ancient Bulgarians are said to have been unrivalled masters 
  in the arts of jewellery’. [D 2005: 92] 
(25)   Ivan včera se napil. 
  ‘Ivan is said to have got drunk yesterday’.
Such instances (which are numerous in speech) conﬁ  rm that, per se, the ‘preiz 
kazni formiʼ do not carry any additional load beyond an indication of the fact 
that the speaker has not experienced the described state of aﬀ  airs him/herself.
Based on this, we should consider examples like (26), a heading in a daily 
newspaper (cited from [N 2008: 390]):
(26)  Kitaec otkril Amerika 1000 godini predi Kolumb.
  ‘A Chinese man allegedly discovered America 1000 years before 
  Columbus’.
Here the speaker can be interpreted as meaning to imply that the proposition 
might not be true (or might not deserve to be given too much trust). However, 
this implicature can only be computed on the basis of the further background 
supplied either by the broader linguistic context (the text following after this 
heading) or by situational or encyclopedic knowledge such as, e. g., acquain 
tance with the writer’s skeptical stance toward anybody said to have discov 
ered America before Columbus.
Furthermore, the ‘preizkazni formi’ fulﬁ  ll stylistic and discourse speciﬁ  c 
functions. They are the main predicative forms in fairy tales, legends, and other 
originally oral genres of folklore as well as in history books for children if they 
treat events of a remote past. Not surprisingly, they are not at all encountered 
in scientiﬁ  c texts; in police protocols containing witnesses’ recalls of crimes 
and accidents, the usual grammatical forms for verbs to appear are the present |  25 
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perfect and the “historical” present, but not the ‘preizkazni formi’19. Conse 
quently, one gains the impression that these forms are, in principle, avoided in 
genres and discourse types with serious, conﬁ  rmed backgrounds, for which 
subjective  interpretations,  doubts,  or  mistakes  are  unwarranted;  compare 
Korytkowska’s conclusions above. In accordance with this, Nicolova made a 
suggestion very much to the point, namely, that reportive evidentials stylisti 
cally transform utterances from an oﬃ   cial to a colloquial level, to hearsay and 
gossip [N 2008: 390; cf. also S 2012: 367, 369]. This is 
certainly an eﬀ  ect which many genres and discourse types do not pursue. As 
concerns modal functions of ‘preizkazni formi’, their most essential feature is 
the expression of distance and reservation, which is very useful in polemical 
discourse and often exploited by journalists in the mass media20. Actually, we 
arrive here at hedging functions, which can be seen as a functional extension 
of the evidential epistemic tip eﬀ  ects of ‘preizkazni formi’.
On ﬁ  rst sight, these observations seem to contradict each other, or at least 
they are not easily reconciled. This impression, however, is only apparent. As 
G [1996: 55] puts it, the crucial function of ‘preizkazni formi’ is 
to mark that the speaker is refraining from taking responsibility for the ut 
tered assertion; as a consequence, this assertion is located outside of truth 
conditional judgments21. W [2006], with respect to lexical markers in 
Polish, has called this ‘epistemic agnosticism’: the speaker does not make any 
statement concerning truth or falsity, or the degree of reliability, of the respec 
tive proposition(s). This agnostic stance can become the point of departure 
for virtually any kind of discourse conditioned implicature; in other words, 
the interpretation of these forms rests on pragmatics, it is not derived from 
a straightforward decoding of their semantics. Whether (or not) these forms 
easily trigger implicatures concerning the epistemic stance of the (re )narrat 
ing speaker often depends on speciﬁ  c discourse conditions insofar as these re 
ﬂ  ect diﬀ  erent pragmatic strategies22. Therefore, if the speaker (writer) is eager 
to avoid any epistemic overtones able to cast doubt on the veracity of his/her 
words (conveying another person’s, or other people’s, previous utterances), 
s/he avoids forms marked for indirect experience (as the Bulgarian ‘preiz 
19  Present tense forms are quite often accompanied by the lexical marker spored X 
'‘according to X’. Although we have authentic examples of such usage in police and 
court protocols, we do not adduce them here for ethical reasons.
20 For an overview on the usage of grammatical evidentiality markers in different registers 
cf. [N 2008: 385–392]. For further references cf. [S 2012: 369f].
21 The original wording is: “(…) l’énoncé médiatisé n’exprime aucune garantie des propos 
rapportés et place l’énoncé hors d’une assignation référentielle en «vrai» ou «faux»”.
22 These, in turn, may be guided by superordinate illocutionary goals and cultural 
traditions. However, the investigation of such “higher order” motifs for the 
development and use of evidential marking in discourse goes beyond the scope of our 
contribution.26  |
Slověne   2012 №2
On conditions instantiating tip effects 
of epistemic and evidential meanings in Bulgarian
kazni formi’) altogether. This avoidance strategy guarantees him/her a safe 
guard against possible objections of conveying non trustworthy information. 
For obvious reasons, this eﬀ  ect has to be circumvented by any means not only 
in contexts of revelation, but also in the original narration of epic genres (nov 
els etc.) as well as in protocols and other sorts of testimony. On the other hand, 
if the speaker (writer) does want to stress that the proposition(s) formulated 
by him/her do not rest on direct experience, s/he may mean to safeguard him/
herself against objections that s/he is telling something for which s/he did not 
have direct access. This strategy justiﬁ  es itself in reports about reconstruct 
ed events, such as relations about very remote historical events (especially if 
they are not given as a report of mere facts, but rather told, as would be more 
appropriate if the addressees are children), or if events are re narrated and 
should be marked as such. Whether this marking causes epistemic overtones, 
such that indirect access implies lack of reliable enough experience, is a sepa 
rate issue which has to be approached empirically.
Regardless, the interaction between epistemic agnosticism and epistemic 
implicatures that can, but need not, be triggered relies on a general mecha 
nism between semantics and pragmatic conditions; it need not be restricted to 
grammatical (or paradigmatic) form inventories but can prove valid for lexical 
markers, too. And it should hold for the relation of inferential (i. e., evidential) 
and properly epistemic meaning components as well. This is what we will sub 
sequently demonstrate.
  3.2.2  Non generalizable macro contextual and encyclopedic factors
In the case of inferential evidence, the macro contextual factors inﬂ  uencing 
evidential epistemic tip eﬀ  ects can hardly be generalized. Inferential state 
ments are the result of a basic cognitive process that is not reserved for one or 
other functional register and discourse type.
A macro context often contains some speciﬁ  c reference to a particular 
source of information. For the reader it is usually not diﬃ   cult to use such indi 
cations in the macro context as support for a reconstruction of the cognitive 
background that triggers the respective inference. Such a case is illustrated by 
the following example:
(27)   Starĳ  at nabožen dărdorko, osven podagrata si, očevidno be pipnal i 
  skleroza.
  ‘The old pious chatterbox obviously has sclerosis in addition to his 
  gout disease’. [BC: N]
This sentence is excerpted from the internal dialogue of a young man angry 
about his father who tells him to learn a part of the Bible by heart. The son is 
irritated by these words because the old man had apparently forgotten that his 
son has known the whole Bible by heart since his childhood.|  27 
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Consider two further examples from modern ﬁ  ction:
(28)   Izgležda, momičeto ne beše tova, koeto otnačalo pomislih. 
  ‘The girl was obviously not what I inferred her to be’. [B, 12]
The protagonist meets a girl in a restaurant who, without invitation, gets in his 
car and waits there for him. After an initial surprise he notices that she is not 
a prostitute but a strange little person. The protagonist thinks this while talk 
ing to the girl. The evidential basis of the utterance is reconstructable for the 
reader who follows the conversation between the protagonist and the strange, 
mentally ill girl.
(29)  Tazi večer očevidno vsički bărzaha.
  ‘This evening, it seemed, everybody was in a hurry’. [BC: T]
This sentence forms part of the internal dialogue of the metaspeaker who 
works as a taxi driver. In the novel, the story of an evening at his work is nar 
rated. It begins with criminal clients who get into his taxi and force him to 
drive too fast. The quoted words are pronounced after a couple with a preg 
nant woman gets into the car and he receives the next order: “To the hospital. 
Immediately!” Without this knowledge provided by the macro context, the 
evidential basis of the utterance cannot be reconstructed.
Finally, some speciﬁ  c reference to the source of information may be re 
constructed due to the reader’s (or listener’s) encyclopedic knowledge. Al 
though there is no direct reference to any source of information in the text, it 
is still possible for the reader/listener to reconstruct it on the basic of general 
encyclopedic knowledge which an average adult person (raised in the given 
culture) possesses. It is like a script which the involved person completes in 
the process of understanding the text. Compare the following example:
(30)  Aleksi, izgležda, če săm zabremenjala. 
  ‘Aleksi, it seems that I have gotten pregnant’. [BG, 103]
Here encyclopedic knowledge derives from the changes in the physiology of a 
woman which result from her pregnancy.
In cognitive processes, an important role is played by stereotype images, 
connected to diﬀ  erent entities, in this case the image of a central street and a 
square in a small village. This image is the basis for the inference made:
(31)  Ponesoha se zaplašitelno bărzo meždu skupčenite kăštja, prehvărčaha 
  prez nešto, koeto očevidno beše glavnata ulica s centralnĳ  a ploštad na 
  neja.
  ‘They rushed threateningly fast along the crowded houses, ﬂ  ew 
  through something which was obviously the main street with the 
  central square in it’. [BC: RR 2]28  |
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Similarly, people share some general knowledge or stereotype image of the 
properties of expensive shoes which allows the protagonist to draw such an 
inference about the high value of the shoes only from seeing them:
(32)  Obuvkite bjaha javno mnogo skăpi. 
  ‘The shoes were obviously very expensive’. [BC: FD]
3.3  No clear reference to any source of information
Another situation applies if we can ﬁ  nd no speciﬁ  c reference to a particular 
source of information either in the micro context or the macro context and 
general encyclopaedic knowledge is not helpful either. There are no facts re 
ferred to, nor is there an obvious single possible explanation. In this case, the 
evidential function appears only in the background or cannot be clearly dis 
tinguished from the epistemic one. We should demonstrate this eﬀ  ect ﬁ  rst for 
markers with a semantic default of perception based inferences and, second, 
for markers which occur predominantly with reference to deductive (i. e., non 
perception based) reasoning. As explained in 2.3, this distinction practically 
coincides with Squartini’s distinction between ‘circumstantials’ and ‘generics’.
Since there is no explicit reference to any source of information in head 
ings, only a vague kind of feeling or intuition can function as such “reference”: 
under such conditions some markers with an evidential default of perception 
based inferences receive a discourse induced hedge function. This function 
can be observed especially with the markers kato če li and sjakaš (belonging to 
type A), both units originating in comparative constructions (‘as if’). Let us 
have a look at two examples taken from headings of newspaper articles:
(33)  Rajna Petrova: Sjakaš ima diskriminacĳ  a kăm "Centralen", "Severen" 
  i "Južen".  
  ‘Rajna Petrova: It seems that there is a discrimination of the “Central”, 
  “North” and “South” districts’.
  [heading of an online newspaper, http://news.plovdiv24.bg/223626.html] 
In a short piece of internet news, arguments are exchanged and an evidential 
basis for the inferences drawn is provided, but the primary function of the 
marker in the summarizing heading is to soften an otherwise rather critical 
statement. Possibly the word diskriminacĳ  a was used by the person, Rajna 
Petrova, herself, together with sjakaš used rather as a hedge. Alternatively, out 
of additional context, we could also understand that the use of both diskrimi 
nacĳ  a and sjakaš is to be ascribed to the reporting journalist who chose to re 
strain him/herself from taking the responsibility for using such a strong word. 
A very similar situation arises in the next example:|  29 
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(34)  Krizata kato če li si otiva ot Evropa. 
  ‘It seems as if the crisis was leaving Europe’. 
  [heading of an online newspaper,
  http://www.investor.bg/analizi/91/a/krizata kato che li si otiva ot  
  evropa,85227/] 
Of course, a feeling or an intuition as source of information is only a weak 
piece of evidence (if it indeed constitutes evidence at all) because of their very 
subjective and unprovable nature. Thus markers such as those just illustrated 
are predestined as hedges if no reference to some more objective source is sup 
plied, or in isolated utterances such as headings.
Furthermore, the inferential function quite often cannot clearly be iso 
lated from the epistemic function. Normally, the markers being discussed 
here have a salient inferential (i. e., evidential) function. Nonetheless an epi 
stemic assessment interferes quite often and, given favorable conditions, can 
push into the background the otherwise prominent inferential default. This 
can happen even in those cases when an evidential marker has a default on 
perception based inferences and is etymologically connected to the concept of 
seeing or looking, such as izgležda ‘it seems’, očevidno ‘obviously’, javno ‘obvi 
ously’, po vsičko liči ‘on all appearances’ (cf. [K, W 2011a: 68ﬀ  .]). 
The transformation into a non perceptive, entirely cognitive process of “see 
ing” (seeing → understanding) is an appropriate basis for overwriting this 
default. In most cases there is some reference for the inferential process in the 
micro  or macro context (see 3.1.2 and 3.2.2). However, the speaker can also 
make a statement without providing a clue to justify it. As a result, this com 
munication strategy yields the impression of epistemic reservation yielding a 
hedge as in (35), or the impression of common knowledge which the speaker 
does not ﬁ  nd necessary to explicate, as in (36) and (37):
(35)  Ako Pep 227 se dava na hora s marker za avtoimunna reakcĳ  a, to
   izgležda toj može da gi predpazva ot bădešta izjava Tip 1 diabet.
  ‘If Pep 227 is given to people with an indication of autoimmune 
  reaction, it seems that it can prevent a manifestation of diabetes 
  type 1 in the future’. [BC]
(36)   Zaštoto demokracĳ  ata očevidno veče beše na păt, ot kojto ne možeš 
  da ja vărneš. 
  ‘Because obviously democracy was on a track, from which 
  nobody could bring it back’. 
  [BC: http://www.vesti.bg/index.phtml?tid=40&oid=361741]
(37)  Procesăt bez sămnenie e bolezen, no javno e neizbežen pri 
  preminavaneto na edna političeska sila ot upravlenie v opozicĳ  a. 30  |
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  ‘This process is without doubt painful, but obviously it is inevitable 
  during the transition of a political force from government to 
  opposition’. [BC]
Markers of this type often fulﬁ  ll a discourse rhetorical function to emphasize 
the author’s point of view while criticizing something or somebody (e. g., in 
journalists’ polemics):
(38)  No obratnata strana izgležda ošte dălgo njama da se vzema predvid 
  pri opredeljane na obštestvenata politika. 
  ‘It seems that the other side won't yet be taken into consideration 
  for a very long time for the determination of the social politics’. 
  [BC: http://www.komentari.com/web/modules.php?name=News&ﬁ  l 
  e=print&sid=39]
(39)  Stanimir Hasărdžiev: Očevidno njakoj ima interes v Bălgarĳ  a da 
  njama transplantacii. 
  ‘Stanimir Hasărdžiev: Obviously somebody has an interest in there 
  being no transplantations in Bulgaria’.
  [heading from an online newspaper, http://www.cross.bg/1192524] 
Now let us turn to markers which predominantly mark generic (deduc 
tive) inferences or, more precisely, which do not have a semantic default of 
perception based inferences. Markers like navjarno ‘probably’ (characteris 
tic for more sophisticated literal text sorts) and verojatno, sigurno ‘probably, 
certainly’ (stylistically neutral) belong here; they mostly refer to inferences 
without a particular indication in the micro  or macro context. In this case, 
the modal function seems to be the more important one from the communica 
tive point of view. The evidential function is in the background or not present 
at all, because the source of information is not obvious, being a result of an 
individual, not always comprehensible deduction.
The reconstruction of a deductive process varies individually for every 
reader or listener. In the following example, the evidence can be reconstructed 
only by the “competent” reader who knows the action and the protagonists of 
the given literal text:
(40)  Tolkova mnogo cvetja tja navjarno ne beše viždala prez celĳ  a si život.
  ‘She had probably not seen so many ﬂ  owers during her whole life.’
   [B, 53]
The logical argument serving as evidence for this statement is accessible 
only to those who know that the protagonist of the novel is a girl with psycho 
logical traumata from childhood who spent many years in psychiatry and did 
not have the opportunity to enjoy the beauty of nature. As a test, we try to re 
place the marker used originally by a marker with a perception based default, |  31 
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for instance izgležda ‘it seems’. In the given context, this replacement is not 
felicitous. So we can speak here about a predominant epistemic presumption.
The logical argumentation can be rather original and non trivial. In this 
case the evidential function does not appear at all, contrary to the emergent 
epistemic function:
(41)  Navjarno taka e pravel i Lobačevski, dokato e izveždal svoite formuli.
  ‘Perhaps Lobačevski did so, too, when deducing his formulae’. [BG, 142]
The context this utterance occurs in is a description of the scientiﬁ  c work of 
the protagonist ﬁ  ghting against distracting thoughts and trying to concen 
trate  on  a  complicated  subject.  The  comparison  with  the  famous  Russian 
mathematician and geometrician who lived in the 19th century is a product of 
the fantasy of the author. Lobačevski’s name could, in this case, be replaced by 
any other inventor’s name. Thus the utterance is a mere presumption without 
any evidential basis.
The next example shows a similar case. The marker functions as a means 
to involve the reader in the described ﬁ  ctive world. The author tries to share 
the cognitive basis of his/her own inference with the reader/listener: 
(42)  Navjarno mnozina ot vas sa viždali tova staro, pečalno zdanie săs 
  zarešeteni prozorci.
  ‘Probably many of you have already seen this old, sad building with 
  barred windows’. [B, 23]
The reconstruction of the cognitive basis could refer to the fact that the build 
ing is so strikingly awful and sad that it may be known to many of the readers. 
However, this reconstruction is not at all obvious, the replacement with a per 
ception based marker is completely impossible, so that here only the epistemic 
function comes to the fore.
The evidential reading in constructions with markers like navjarno ‘prob 
ably’ gets support only in cases when the logical relation in an utterance is 
explicit, although the epistemic function is nevertheless present, too. In the 
next example, navjarno could be easily replaced by izgležda ‘it seems’, očevidno 
'‘obviously’ or javno ‘evidently’, so that the evidential function would move into 
the foreground:
(43)  I navjarno vseki moment šte se vărne, štom dori ne e ugasila lampite.
  ‘And probably she will return any moment, for she has not switched 
  oﬀ   the light’. [B, 91]
Compare the perception based inference in (43) with example (44), where 
the epistemic and the evidential reading are combined, too. The felicitous re 
placement of the original marker with izgležda would push the non percep 
tion based inference into the foreground:32  |
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(44)  Otdavna bjah zabeljazal, če vnušavam osoben respekt na obikno
  venite hora, navjarno smjataha, če săm njakakăv preoblečen general. 
  ‘I had noticed long ago that I inspired a particular respect in common 
  people; probably they considered me to be a disguised general.’  
  [B, 63]
4.  Summing up the findings
From the analysis conducted in the preceding section, we may deduce that there 
is a suﬃ   ciently tight correlation between the direction of tip eﬀ  ects toward epis 
temic or evidential (more precisely: inferential) function, on the one hand, and 
the degree of transparency with which the recipient (hearer, reader) can (re)
construct a speciﬁ  c basis of judgment uttered by the author, on the other. In 
other words, an inferential (evidential) meaning component is more likely to be 
foregrounded the more the recipient is given hints in favor of a speciﬁ  c basis 
of judgment. The inferential meaning is the least salient or absent with indis 
criminate markers of inferential functions (e. g., navjarno, verojatno ‘probably’) if 
the context also does not supply clues for some more speciﬁ  c basis of judgment. 
On the contrary, the inferential meaning becomes more highlighted the more 
the basis of judgment is made speciﬁ  c. With markers that, by default, refer to 
perception based inferences (‘circumstantials’) the inferential meaning will not 
be completely suppressed even if the context does not give further hints as to the 
type of basis of judgment (e. g., izgležda ‘it seems’, sjakaš ‘as if’). With markers 
that mainly refer to non perception based inferences (‘generics’), the inferential 
meaning can be more easily overshadowed by an epistemic function if the con 
text does not help specifying the basis of judgment (as it does, e. g., in ex. 43).
From the observations made above concerning lexical markers of inferen 
tial meanings in Bulgarian we may thus draw one basic conclusion:
The more complicated the reconstruction of the cognitive (or 
communicative) basis leading to an inference (intended by the 
speaker), the clearer the epistemic function emerges while the 
evidential function remains in the background, and vice versa.
From the picture we gained in sections 2.4 and 3, we may further conclude 
that there is a tension between the meaning potential of a lexical unit able to 
indicate evidential and/or epistemic functions, on the one hand, and expecta 
tions arising from certain discourse (or text) types, on the other. The question 
is which side of this tension dominates so that it can change the “value” of the 
dominated part.
If, as with some German and Polish reportive markers (Germ. angeblich, 
Pol. podobno, jakoby), the epistemic “ﬂ  avor” of doubt can be cancelled but the |  33 
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reportive value remains under any context conditions (cf. [W, S 
2010]), it is indisputable that the evidential (reportive) component represents 
a stable meaning component of these units. But it is also evident that, in the 
relation between the epistemic component and the discourse type, it is the lat 
ter which can suppress epistemic inferences (which otherwise arise as GCIs).
Superﬁ  cially, one might think that the opposite direction of dominance 
holds with Bulgarian ‘preizkazni formi’: they are avoided (or inappropriate) in 
all sorts of legally relevant contexts when the reporting speaker could be made 
responsible for an imprecise formulation of the reported propositional con 
tent. Even more remarkably, ‘preizkazni formi’ do not occur in those parts of 
the Bible which convey acts of revelation (unless they are conveyed as though 
they were reported, see below). Furthermore, in modern speech, ‘preizkazni 
formi’ are frequently used in all sorts of polemics and in argumentative dis 
course when the speaker/writer wants to distance him/herself from his/her 
opponent’s view (see 3.2.1). One is thus tempted to conclude that, for ‘pre 
izkazni formi’, it is the epistemic load (distancing from the reported content) 
which has to be assigned a stable status in the meaning of these forms, that 
this load dominates over their potential as markers of evidential functions, 
and, moreover, that this load cannot be suppressed by the context or speciﬁ  c 
discourse type (their “macro illocutive” purpose as well as an institutional 
frame in which they are often produced).
However, based on this conclusion we would be unable to explain why 
'‘preizkazni formi’ do occur in pure renarration and in propositional arguments 
of verba dicendi, sentiendi, and percipiendi with clearly identiﬁ  able authors, 
for which there is no ground to assume any epistemic overtones. Note that 
'‘preizkazni formi’ are not unusual in passages when the author is a prophet or 
a saint, who is believed to conduct the godly revelation correctly, e. g., by citing 
or paraphrasing Jesus’ sermons. The New Testament would fail its purpose if 
these words (“quotes”) were not to reveal God’s truth which believing Chris 
tians (i. e., the intended recipients of the New Testament) cannot doubt. If, 
thus, we dismiss the view that these forms are inherently epistemically loaded, 
the context cannot suppress what does not exist. We might rather say that 
discourse conditions do not allow epistemic implicatures to arise. Such im 
plicatures are triggered depending on higher order considerations, like those 
displayed in 3.2.1.
In summary, again, the evidential potential is stable while diﬀ  erent types 
of context lead to more or less predictable implicatures in favor or disfavor of 
epistemic distance. As regards the nature of the implicatures, we may consider 
them as Generalized Conversational Implicatures, however, we should formu 
late more precisely that the GCIs detected for Bulgarian ‘preizkazni formi’ and 
lexical markers of evidential epistemic meanings do not only, and probably 34  |
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not so much, depend “upon expectations about how language is characteris 
tically used” (see 2.1), but rather on expectations concerning distinguished 
(and generalizable) types of discourse and text genres. We have to further 
admit that the considerations on ‘preizkazni formi’ apply only to their “non 
dubitative” subparadigm, as explained in 3.2.1.
Further, for these reasons, we cannot sustain claims according to which 
the Bulgarian grammatical system of evidentiality marking is modalized per 
se. For instance, P [2001: 354f.; 2010: 31f.] made such a claim by 
arguing that in languages with systems consisting of a binary opposition of 
marked vs. unmarked forms, the functionally marked forms serve as general 
indicators of indirect access to the source of information (see 2.3), for which 
this rather indiscriminate evidential meaning is “as a rule, not separated from 
the modal meaning, more precisely, from the meaning of epistemic assess 
ment”  [P  2010:  31].  The  empirical  picture  presented  above  does 
not corroborate Plungian’s statement, at least not in such a general fashion. 
Remarkably, Plungian himself conceded that “uncertainty” would be better 
replaced by “epistemic distance”; the latter means that “the speakers refrain 
from taking over responsibility of the truth value of an utterance since the 
respective information did not enter into their personal sphere” [P 
2010: 32]. Plungian’s ‘epistemic distance’ is actually an equivalent to epistemic 
agnosticism and Guentchéva’s distinction cited in 3.2.1; ‘epistemic distance’ 
should thus not be mixed up with epistemic assessment (or reservation).
In connection with this, we can apply a very useful criterion supplied 
by Plungian himself, a criterion by which one can establish the relation of 
general markers of indirect experience to epistemic assessment, namely: one 
should look at whether the respective markers are used “to formulate utter 
ances of the type “general truths” (i. e. those which are unconditionally taken 
for granted in a given community) or utterances that refer to well known 
facts (for example, facts related to the past of a given community), i.e. types 
of information which speakers cannot observe personally” [P 2010: 
32]. In general, one would expect languages with binary marking of direct vs. 
indirect experience (as the Bulgarian ‘preizkazni formi’) to not use markers 
of indirect evidentiality in such contexts, “in order to avoid an unnecessary 
epistemic load” (ibd.). As shown above, in Bulgarian this prediction holds true 
for acts of revelation but not for general truths, e. g., of history.|  35 
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